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Introduction and summary
Economists and business analysts alike have long
recognized the central role played by swings in in-
ventory accumulation during cyclical contractions in
the economy. The importance of understanding inven-
tory behavior cannot be overstated when analyzing
business cycles. In the United States, for example,
declines in inventory investment, defined as the
change in inventory levels, have accounted for 76 per-
cent of the peak-to-trough decline in gross domestic
product (GDP) in the average postwar recession. In
fact, inventories matter throughout the business
cyclealthough inventory investment has averaged
less than 1 percent of the level of postwar GDP, the
change in inventory investment has averaged over
one-third the size of quarterly changes in GDP in the
postwar era.
Although it is easy to see how inventories are
important in cyclical fluctuations, other aspects of
inventory behavior remain poorly understood. For
example, to what extent have firms lived up to much-
lauded just-in-time inventory management tech-
niques? If inventory holdings truly have fallen, what
does this imply about the role of inventories in future
cyclical fluctuations? After all, if inventory investment
swings are eliminated or lessened by moving to just-
in-time techniques, then inventories may no longer
remain a crucial link between negative shocks to out-
put and, consequently, employment fluctuations.
Recent research offers several pieces of evi-
dence on these issues. McConnell and Quiros (1997)
argue that GDP volatility declined significantly in
the early 1980s, and they identify a decline in the
volatility of durable goods production as its likely
source. Since they find no commensurate decline in
the volatility of sales over this period, they conclude
that changes in inventory behavior are behind their
result. They also suggest that future work could
investigate which sectors have used just-in-time
inventory techniques and which have contributed
the most to the decline in volatility. Ben Salem and
Jacques (1996) and Hirsch (1996) find that inventory
sales (IS) ratios have declined in the manufacturing
sector, where just-in-time inventory management
techniques are believed to be more common, but
that ratios have risen in the wholesale and retail
trade sectors.
In this article, I review recent developments in
inventory behavior, with the following questions in
mind. Have the recent, well-publicized changes in in-
ventory management techniques affected inventory
behavior at the aggregate level? In particular, have
IS ratios declined and, if so, in which sectors? Has
the volatility of inventory investment declined in re-
cent years, and if so, has it declined in those sectors
in which IS ratios have fallen? Answering these ques-
tions is important to policymakers who must estab-
lish fiscal and monetary policies for an economy with
some inherent volatility to the paths of output and
employment.
My research strategy is to take as given the
McConnell and Quiros (1997) finding of a one-time
decline in GDP volatility in 1984:Q1 and to investigate
a variety of inventory-related measures, comparing
the pre-1984 period with the subsequent period. Like
some previous researchers, I find that IS ratios have
actually risen somewhat in the trade (merchant whole-
sale and retail) sectors of the economy but have fallen
in the manufacturing sector, especially among durable
goods manufacturers. I also find that, by two separate3 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
measures, inventory investment volatility has de-
creased somewhat since 1984. This decrease arises
from the manufacturing and merchant wholesale sec-
tors; in retailing, volatility has risen by one measure
but fallen, though not in a statistically significant way,
by another. Overall, I find little relationship between
sectoral changes in average IS ratios and changes in
inventory investment volatility.
My results point to three main conclusions. First,
though IS ratios have not, on balance, changed that
much, inventory investment volatility has declined
nonetheless. This suggests that recent changes in
inventory management techniques have affected the
volatility of inventories at least as much as their aver-
age levels. Second, the retail sector has not experi-
enced the volatility declines of the manufacturing
and merchant wholesale sectors. This is important,
because swings in inventory investment by retailers
comprise a big part of total business inventory move-
ments over business cycles. Thus, analysts studying
inventories for clues about cyclical turning points
and the like may wish to focus more closely on the
retail sector. Finally, sectors in which firms success-
fully decrease their average inventory holdings need
not be the same sectors in which inventory invest-
ment volatility declines as well. This suggests that
new inventory management techniques that focus
on forcing IS ratios downward will not completely
remove inventory investment fluctuations as factors
in future business cycles.
The role of inventories in the
macroeconomy
Economists care about inventory behavior be-
cause, historically, swings in inventory investment
have played a prominent role in cyclical fluctuations.
In brief, inventory investment is highly volatile and
contributes significantly to recessionary declines in
GDP. Figure 1, which plots the ratio of economy-wide
inventory stocks to final sales of domestic product
(final sales of domestic product equals gross domes-
tic product less the change in business inventories),
shows that IS ratios are countercyclical, rising during
recessions and falling in expansions. In fact, inventory
disinvestment is a central part of cyclical contractions.
Table 1 reports the average postwar contribution of
changes in inventory accumulation (inventory disin-
vestment) to the peak-to-trough decline in GDP. The
table shows that the decline in inventory investment
accounted for 76 percent of GDPs decline in the
average postwar recession. Panel A of table 1 reveals
three features of the data. First, the manufacturing
and retail sectors dominate the wholesale trade sec-
tor, accounting for most of the inventory effect. Sec-
ond, as Blinder and Maccini (1991) found in their ear-
lier survey of research on inventories, finished goods
inventories held by manufacturers account for little
of the total contribution (6 percent postwar average)
despite being the focus of much economic research.
In contrast, goods in progress and, to a lesser extent,
materials and supplies held by manufacturers are
more important. Finally, table 1 shows
that unsold (final) goods held by retailers
account for one-third (.26/.76) of the con-
tribution of inventories.
Complementary evidence is in panel
B of table 1, which highlights the impor-
tance of durable goods inventories. Of
the manufacturing sectors total average
contribution of 35 percent of the peak-to-
trough decline in GDP, durable goods
manufacturers accounted for 28 percent.
In the wholesale trade sector, durable
goods firms accounted for the sectors
entire share of 5 percent; and in the retail
sector, durable goods firms accounted
for 23 percent of the sectors 26 percent
contribution. Table 1s evidence, on bal-
ance, suggests that durable goods inven-
tories held by manufacturers and retailers
are key to any analysis of the cyclical be-
havior of inventories.
FIGURE 1
Inventorysales ratio, total business
months
Notes: Raw data are in billions of chained 1992 dollars. Ratios
are scaled to equal number of months. Shaded areas denote
recessions.





Table 2 offers an alternative perspective on the
role of inventory investment. The volatility of manu-
facturing and trade sector inventory investment rela-
tive to GDP volatility was about one-third (.365) over
the sample period 1960:Q197:Q4. By this standard,
the retail sector is more volatile than the manufacturing
sector, with inventory investment swings averaging
21.8 percent of the quarterly change in GDP, compared
with 19.1 percent for the manufacturing sector. Taken
together, then, tables 1 and 2 point to the manufactur-
ing and retail sectors as key sectors to analyze.
Theories of inventory behavior
Economists have developed several models of
inventory behavior; a recent review is in Fitzgerald
(1997). Probably the most familiar model is the produc-
tion-smoothing model, in which firms are assumed to
face increasing marginal costs of production. Under
this scenario, firms facing variable demand for their
product draw down and build up their inventories as
needed, to limit variation in production. Among other
things, the model implies that production is less vari-
able than sales and that sales and inventory invest-
ment are negatively correlated. As Fitzgerald (1997),
Blinder and Maccini (1991), and others have shown,
simple correlations from aggregate data are inconsis-
tent with these implications: In other words, produc-
tion is typically more, not less, variable than sales,
and sales and inventory investment are typically pos-
itively, not negatively, correlated. Although modifica-
tions to the model, including adding cost shocks or
staggered price setting behavior, generate predictions
more consistent with the data, some economists have
argued that pursuing this line of argument is not like-
ly to be fruitful (Fitzgerald, 1997; Hornstein and Sarte,
1998). In fact, the simple production smoothing mod-
els poor empirical performance may simply reflect the
observation that the model is best suited to describ-
ing the components of inventories that are least impor-
tant cyclically, namely finished goods held by manu-
facturers. Consequently, other economists have
focused on developing models to describe the com-
ponents of inventories that seem to pack more of a
cyclical punch, namely goods held by retailers and
raw materials and supplies held by manufacturers.
These two components of inventories have in com-
mon that the firms do not produce the items and
then store them; rather, the firms take delivery of the
items and store them. This leads to the second broad
class of inventory models, (S,s) models.
In these alternative models, sometime called
threshold models, firms are willing to let their inven-
tories fluctuate between (optimally chosen) lower
bound s and upper bound S; once stocks break
through the limits, firms adjust production (orders)
all at once to return inventories to their desired
range; that is, firms place new orders for goods. These
models are typically based on the assumption that
firms face some fixed cost in adjusting their production
TABLE 1




Total change in business inventories 76
Manufacturing 35
Materials & supplies 9















Notes: Raw data are in billions of chained 1992 dollars. Shares
are computed by sector for each postwar recession; the mean
over all recessions is reported.
Source: Author’s calculations using data from U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis.
TABLE 2
Volatility of inventory investment
All inventories .365




Notes: Raw data are in billions of chained 1992 dollars.
Volatility of inventory investment is defined as the ratio of
the mean of the absolute value of the change in inventory
investment (relative to GDP) to the mean of the absolute
value of the change in GDP (relative to GDP). Means are
calculated over the 1960:Q1–97:Q4 period.
Source: Author’s calculations using data from U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis.5 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
(delivery) levels. Given this fixed cost, the model im-
plies that firms will bunch up their deliveries, and
its implications directly counter those of the produc-
tion-smoothing models: Deliveries will be more vola-
tile than sales, and inventory investment and sales
will be positively correlated.
Several recent papers develop and test the impli-
cations of these models. For example, Fisher and
Hornstein (1998) embed an (S,s) model into a general
equilibrium business cycle model and find that inven-
tories can propagate certain kinds of shocks, though
only when the (S,s) model is combined with general
equilibrium entry of new firms and feedback pricing
behavior by firms. McCarthy and Zakrajsec (1997,
1998) present empirical evidence on cost functions
that is consistent with the use of (S,s)-type invento-
ry policies.
Before turning to the data analyzed here, it is
useful to review recent arguments made in the busi-
ness press regarding changes in inventory manage-
ment techniques. Many press accounts have centered
on the manufacturing sector, in which efforts to reduce
inventories are viewed as part of a move toward lean
manufacturing. In the retail sector, the equivalent
of lean inventories is often described as a quick re-
sponse system. According to press accounts, many
retailers have exploited new technologies, such as
bar coding and point of sale scanning, which have
enabled them to cut inventory holdings. Further, more
coordination between retailers and their suppliers
based on techniques such as shared sales data and
business documents has allowed some retailers to
cut the time needed to restock their shelves. One
interpretation of these developments is that they de-
crease the fixed costs of ordering goods. In the (S,s)
model framework, developments which lower the
fixed cost of ordering will tend to smooth out orders
more, as firms let their inventory levels fluctuate in
narrower bands than before. If U.S. manufacturing
and retailing firms have truly embraced new tech-
niques and smoothed out their production and
restocking behavior, we should see some evidence
of this in the aggregate data.
Inventory behavior before and after 1984
McConnell and Quiros (1997) offer some evidence
that the role of inventories in output fluctuations has
declined since the early 1980s. They present informal
evidence that postwar GDP volatility declined in the
early 1980s, and they specifically find evidence of a
one-time decline in the volatility of postwar GDP in
1984:Q1. McConnell and Quiros rule out a simultaneous
decline in the volatility of sales, and consequently
point to a decline in the share of inventory invest-
ment in GDP fluctuations as the source of the output
volatility decline.
Here, I investigate this issue by examining inven-
tory and output data for the manufacturing and trade
sectors between 1960 and 1997. Because manufactur-
ing and retail are the key sectors for cyclical purposes,
and because much previous research has focused
exclusively on manufacturers inventory patterns, I
consider a fairly detailed breakdown of the retail sec-
tor. In particular, I first consider evidence on IS ratios
and determine which, if any, sectors, show declines
in IS ratios at the point identified by McConnell and
Quiros (1997). Next, I construct two alternative mea-
sures of inventory investment volatility and compare
the early and later period measures. Finally, I relate
sectors change in IS ratios to their change in inven-
tory investment volatility. I find that IS ratios have
risen in the trade sectors but fallen in manufacturing,
but I find little evidence that the sectors in which the
decline in IS ratios is most pronounced are those in
which inventory investment volatility has declined
the most. The retailing sector stands out as a cycli-
cally important sector in which IS ratios have risen
and inventory investment volatility has, at best, not
increased, pointing to a more significant role in future
cyclical fluctuations.
Inventorysales ratios
Despite the impression generated by the business
press, the evidence on declining IS ratios is mixed.
Figure 1, which plots the economy-wide ratio of inven-
tories to final sales of domestic product, shows little
obvious trend since the 1970s. Figure 2, which plots
the IS ratio for the manufacturing and trade sector,
illustrates the importance of using price-adjusted,
as opposed to nominal, measures of inventories:
The nominal data show a much steeper decline in
the IS ratio since the 198182 recession than do the
chain-weighted data. In this article, I use the chain-
weighted data.
The aggregate IS data of figures 1 and 2 mask
considerable differences across the three broad sec-
tors analyzed here, manufacturing, merchant whole-
sale, and retail. In manufacturing (figure 3), the most
dramatic swings have been in the durable goods sec-
tor, where IS ratios have fallen sharply since their
198182 peak. In the two trade sectors (figures 4 and
5), the dominant patterns come from the nondurable
goods sector, where ratios have steadily risen since
the 197475 recession. Since we know from table 1
that inventory swings by durable goods manufactur-
ers play a prominent cyclical role, it is surely worth6 Economic Perspectives
noting that declining IS ratios are most obvious for
that group of firms. In contrast, inventories as a
share of sales held by durable goods retailers have
varied in the same (narrow) range since 1960.
A closer look at the retail sector is presented in
figure 6. Three of the four groups of durable goods
retailers (lumber and building stores; furniture and
furnishings stores; and the residual other catego-
ry) appear to show declining IS ratios. Though IS
ratios have fallen since 1991 in the fourth
group (automotive), the decline may be
more cyclical than secular. Among non-
durable goods retailers, the story is quite
different, as expected given figure 5. For
example, food retailers and department
stores have experienced steadily rising
IS ratios over much of the sample period.
This seems somewhat at odds with the
business press view of at least selected
department store retailers. For example,
in 1996 the Wall Street Journal (Berner,
1996) reported that Sears IS ratio fell
from 2.28 months in 1994 to 2.12 months
in 1995. According to the article, Sears
management centralized many aspects
of the ordering and distribution system
and demanded that suppliers meet Sears
standards for package size, delivery times,
and so on. Similarly, Wal-Mart has been
praised for its inventory management
practices. By the same token, analysts
have asserted that poor inventory man-
agement techniques contributed to the recent demise
and bankruptcy filing of the venerable Woolworths
discount store chain.
On the other hand, figure 6 shows that apparel
store ratios seem to have varied in a lower range
since the 198182 recession, and IS ratios at retailers
in the general merchandise group (excluding depart-
ment stores) have also declined sharply since peaking
in the mid-1980s. One example from the apparel indus-
try is Mothers Work, Inc., which owns
several chains of maternity clothing shops.
According to an article in the Wall Street
Journal (Bird, 1996), this firm closely
monitors sales on a real-time basis, makes
quick decisions on restocking, and pres-
sures suppliers to respond quickly to new
orders. As a result, the firms supply cycle,
from design to store shelves, is much
shorter than those of many of its special-
ty retailer competitors. Further, the firm is
left with less unpopular merchandise to
discount, keeping profit margins high.
Table 3 on page 9 reports mean IS ra-
tios across sectors for three different pe-
riods: 1960:Q197:Q4, 1960:Q183:Q4,
and 1984:Q197:Q4. For the overall manu-
facturing and trade sector, IS ratios aver-
aged 1.33 months in the early sample
period and rose to 1.42 months in the lat-
ter period, with an overall mean of 1.37.
Thus, using the break point suggested
FIGURE 2
Inventorysales ratio, manufacturing and trade
months
Notes: Raw data are in billions of nominal dollars and billions of
chained 1992 dollars. Ratios are scaled to equal number of months.
Shaded areas denote recessions.








Inventorysales ratio, manufacturing sector
months
Notes: Raw data are in billions of chained 1992 dollars. Ratios are
scaled to equal number of months. Shaded areas denote recessions.
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by McConnell and Quiros (1997), we do not see evi-
dence of lower IS ratios overall. Of the three sectors,
only manufacturing shows a decline over time, from
1.53 to 1.50 months, and that decline is not statistically
significant. For the detailed retail sector, we do see
lower mean IS ratios in three of the four durable goods
retailer groups (all except automotive) and in three of
the five nondurable goods retailer groups, generally
consistent with the impressions given by figure 6.
Overall, though, even durable goods retailers averaged
just slightly higher IS ratios in the later
period than the earlier periodnot sur-
prising after seeing figure 5, which sug-
gests little overall trend in IS ratios of
durable goods retailers.
Before turning to the analysis linking
changes in IS ratios with changes in the
volatility of inventory investment, I wish
to briefly touch on two aspects of retailing
that, in principle, offer some perspective
on recent changes in inventory behavior
in the retail sector. The first development
is the substantial industry consolidation
that has taken place in recent years. Cen-
sus data reveal substantial consolidation,
increased average firm size, and increased
concentration ratios since 1972.1 For ex-
ample, between 1972 and 1992, the 50-firm
concentration ratio among department
store retailers rose by 16.1 percentage
points (from 82.1 to 98.2), while among
building supplies retailers, that same ratio
rose from 13.0 to 35.1. Even food retailers have consol-
idated significantly, with the 50-firm concentration
ratio rising from 40.8 to 49.9 between 1972 and 1992.
This increased consolidation among retailers could,
in principle, increase incentives of retailers and their
suppliers to invest in the technologies needed to bet-
ter track and control inventories, leading perhaps to
lower IS ratios. However, panels B and G of figure 6
imply that story is at best incomplete: Though both
building supplies retailers and department stores saw
substantially rising concentration ratios
between 1972 and 1992, their IS ratios
moved in opposite directions over this
time period.
A second recent development is the
increased array of products offered by
retailers. The Census reports, by sector,
the share of sales for each of many lines
of merchandise. From these shares, I con-
struct a product variety index, defined as
the sum of squared shares, summing over
the top five product lines in each sector.
This index, which in principle ranges from
0 to 1, takes on large values when a sec-
tor is undiversified, that is, when most
of its sales are in a small number of prod-
uct lines. Similarly, the index takes on
small values when a sector sells a large
variety of merchandise. By this measure,
product variety increased substantially
in retailing between 1977 and 1992. For
FIGURE 4
Inventorysales ratio, merchant wholesale sector
months
Notes: Raw data are in billions of chained 1992 dollars. Ratios are
scaled to equal number of months. Shaded areas denote recessions.






Inventorysales ratio, retail sector
months
Notes: Raw data are in billions of chained 1992 dollars. Ratios are
scaled to equal number of months. Shaded areas denote recessions.





example, the index for building supply stores fell from
0.43 to 0.29, while that for food stores fell from 0.74 to
0.53. Again, a simple story relating increased product
variety to increased IS ratios does not jump out from
the data, as building supplies retailers show falling IS
ratios (panel B of figure 6) while food retailers (panel
E of figure 6) show rising IS ratios.
The volatility of inventory investment
Next, I compare inventory investment volatility
measures before and after 1984:Q1, the point at which
McConnell and Quiros (1997) find a one-time decline
in GDP volatility. I then relate these volatility measures
to the IS ratios described in the previous section. I
consider two alternative measures of volatility, one
based on the absolute value of the change in invento-
ry investment and the other based on the unexplained
variance in the growth rate of inventory stocks.
My first measure of volatility is similar to the one
presented in table 2. I define the volatility of invento-
ry investment as the mean of the absolute value of
the change in inventory investment, as a share of GDP.
Table 4 reports these figures for the detailed sectors,
with separate calculations reported for the full sample
and the two periods used in table 3. The first line of
table 4 shows that, by this measure, inventory invest-
ment volatility was indeed lower in the later period
than in the early period, falling from .371 to .289.
FIGURE 6
months
Inventorysales ratio, retail sector
A. Automotive sector
months
B. Lumber and building supply stores
months
C. Furniture and furnishings stores
months








H. Other general merchandise stores
months
I. Other nondurable goods
Notes: Raw data are in billions of chained 1992 dollars. Ratios are scaled to equal number of months.
Shaded areas denote recessions.
Source: Author’s calculations using data from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.9 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Volatility fell in the manufacturing and merchant whole-
sale sectors but rose in the retail sector, especially
among durable goods retailers. This suggests an in-
creased cyclical importance of inventory investment
swings of retailers since 1984:Q1.
Figure 7 relates table 3s evidence on IS ratios
and table 4s evidence on inventory investment vola-
tility. For each sector, I compute two ratios. The first
is the ratio of the early periods IS ratio to the later




Manufacturing and trade 1.37 1.33 1.42
Manufacturing 1.52 1.52 1.50
Merchant wholesalers 1.16 1.08 1.30
Retail 1.25 1.15 1.41
Retail–durable goods 1.95 1.92 2.00
Automotive 1.67 1.57 1.85
Building materials 2.11 2.22 1.90
Furniture 2.18 2.25 2.06
Other durable goods 3.01 3.17 2.73
Retail–nondurable goods 0.92 0.82 1.08
Food stores 0.62 0.52 0.76
Apparel & accessories 2.11 2.17 2.01
Department stores 1.62 1.32 2.12
Other general merchandise 1.69 1.77 1.56
Other nondurable goods 0.68 0.69 0.68
Notes: Raw data are in billions of chained 1992 dollars. Ratios are scaled to equal number of months.
Source: Author’s calculations using data from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
TABLE 4
Volatility of inventory investment
1960:Q1–97:Q4 1960:Q1–83:Q4 1984:Q1–97:Q4
Manufacturing and trade .340 .371 .289
Manufacturing .190 .220 .140
Merchant wholesalers .141 .148 .130
Retail .217 .204 .239
Retail–durable goods .189 .176 .212
Automotive .194 .180 .218
Building materials .025 .026 .023
Furniture .018 .014 .024
Other durable goods .041 .044 .036
Retail–nondurable goods .074 .075 .074
Food stores .029 .032 .024
Apparel & accessories .024 .026 .022
Department stores .031 .027 .038
Other general merchandise .019 .020 .018
Other nondurable goods .037 .042 .029
Notes: Raw data are in billions of chained 1992 dollars. Volatility is defined as the mean of the absolute value of the
change in inventory investment as a share of GDP .
Source: Author’s calculations using data from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.10 Economic Perspectives
I compute this ratio for the manufacturing and trade
sector as 1.33/1.42, or 0.94. The second ratio is based
on table 4 and is computed as the early period to later
period ratio of volatility measures. If the
sectors whose IS ratios have fallen are
those whose volatility has declined, then
we should see an upward sloping rela-
tionship in graphs of the first versus the
second ratio. Figure 7 offers little evi-
dence to support this notion. While it is
true that, at the broadest level, the manu-
facturing and trade sectors seem to trace
out a positively sloped line, the points
pertaining to the disaggregate retail sec-
tors do not follow this pattern. That is, in
the retail sector, there seems to be little
relationship between industries whose IS
ratios have declined and those whose in-
ventory investment volatility has de-
clined.
My second set of inventory invest-
ment volatility measures is obtained in a
somewhat different fashion. In particular,
I start by computing the growth rate of
inventory stocks for each sector. I then
estimate a simple autoregressive regres-
sion model in which the dependent vari-
able is the growth rate of inventories (the
rate of inventory investment in percentage terms) and
the independent variable is the lagged growth rate of
inventories. I then use the residuals from this regres-
sion to compute an estimated standard
deviation of the growth rate. To see if
this standard deviation has changed over
time, I simply run a regression of the
standard deviation on a dummy variable
which divides my sample into two periods,
1960:Q283:Q4 and 1984:Q197:Q4. If the
dummy variable is significantly different
from zero, then, by this measure, volatili-
ty differed in the two periods. The results
of this exercise are in table 5.
Table 5 shows that, by this measure,
inventories are more volatile in the trade
sectors than in the manufacturing sector
and that inventory volatility is generally
lower in the later period than in the earlier
period. In broad terms, these results are
similar to those contained in table 4. More
specifically, the decline in inventory vola-
tility is statistically significant in the man-
ufacturing and merchant wholesale sectors
and in several of the disaggregate retail
sectors (automotive, building materials,
other durable goods, food stores, apparel
and accessories, and department stores).
A quick return to table 3 shows no obvious
FIGURE 7
Inventorysales ratios and inventory investment volatility
inventory investment volatility
Notes: Raw data are in billions of chained 1992 dollars. Horizontal axis
is the ratio of early period to later period inventory–sales ratio; vertical
axis is the ratio of early period to later period inventory investment
volatility, where volatility is defined as the mean of the absolute value
of the change in inventory investment as a share of GDP .




Volatility of inventory investment
1960:Q1–83:Q4 1984:Q1–97:Q4
Manufacturing and trade 3.12 2.45
Manufacturing 3.53 2.49b
Merchant wholesalers 6.17 3.93a
Retail 6.27 5.61
Retail–durable goods 11.78 9.40
Automotive 22.94 15.81b
Building materials 9.86 7.27c
Furniture 7.59 7.72
Other durable goods 14.77 7.80a
Retail–nondurable goods 4.43 3.68
Food stores 6.93 5.43c
Apparel & accessories 9.41 7.49c
Department stores 10.62 7.11c
Other general merchandise 15.74 15.11
Other nondurable goods 6.80 5.14c
aVolatility measure differs at a statistical significance level of 1 percent.
bVolatility measure differs at a statistical significance level of 5 percent.
cVolatility measure differs at a statistical significance level of 10 percent.
Notes: Raw data are in billions of chained 1992 dollars. Details of
calculation are provided in text.
Source: Author’s calculations using data from U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis.11 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
relationship between the movement in average IS ratios
and this decline in inventory volatility: Some sectors
had rising IS ratios (merchant wholesalers, automo-
tive retailers, food retailers, and department stores),
others had falling IS ratios (building supplies retail-
ers, other durable goods retailers, apparel and acces-
sories retailers), and manufacturings average IS ratio
was essentially unchanged between the two periods.
Summing up the results of this section, I find that
IS ratios have risen slightly in the trade sectors but
fallen somewhat in the manufacturing sector since
1984:Q1. I also find that inventory investment volatil-
ity for the overall manufacturing and trade sector has
declined somewhat since 1984:Q1, though the differ-
ence is not statistically significant (table 5). In the
manufacturing and merchant wholesale sectors, the
decline in volatility is statistically significant (table
5). In retailing, however, the results are mixed. By one
measure, volatility has risen (table 4). By another, how-
ever, it has fallen (table 5), though the decrease is not
statistically significant. At a minimum, this points to
an increase in the relative importance of the retail sec-
tor in future inventory fluctuations, and it may point
to greater absolute importance as well. Overall, I find
little relationship between sectoral changes in average
IS ratios and changes in inventory investment volatil-
ity. In other words, sectors in which firms successfully
decrease their average inventory holdings need not
be the same sectors in which inventory investment
volatility declines. This suggests that new inventory
management techniques that focus on forcing IS
ratios downward will not completely negate the role
of inventory investment fluctuations in future busi-
ness cycles.
Conclusion
In this article, I have reviewed recent evidence
on IS ratios and inventory investment volatility. I find
that IS ratios have, on balance, not changed that
much, but that the volatility of inventory investment
volatility has declined somewhat since 1984:Q1. This
suggests that the recent changes in inventory man-
agement techniques have affected the volatility of in-
ventories at least as much as their average levels.
I also find that inventory investment volatility has
not declined in the retail sector but has declined in
the manufacturing and merchant wholesale sectors.
Since swings in inventory accumulation by retailers
are important factors in business cycles, analysts
may wish to focus closely on the retail sector, not
just the manufacturing sector, when looking for evi-
dence on cyclical turning points. Finally, since there
appears to be little relationship between movements
in average IS ratios and inventory investment volatil-
ity, analysts should recognize that new inventory
management techniques focused on lowering IS
ratios will not completely remove inventory investment
fluctuations as factors in future business cycles.
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